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Lucio R. Renno
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Partisan theories of political economy expect that bondholders will panic
with the election of a left-wing presidential candidate. The latter seems to be
what happened in Brazil in the 2002 presidential elections. However, quantitative analysis of perceptions of sovereign credit risk in Argentine, Brazilian,
Mexican, and Venezuelan presidential elections from 1994 until 2007 shows
no real evidence of a link between partisanship and perceptions of risk, even
if the left-right divide is further broken down into left, center-left, centerright, right. Instead, international and domestic economic fundamentals have
a stronger influence on risk evaluations. Qualitative analysis of the individual
presidential elections shows the importance of policy uncertainty in explaining why certain electoral periods seemed more critical than others and how
bondholders select between multiple equilibria. This research helps shift
political analysis away from partisanship and more in the direction of policies and articulation.
Keywords:  partisan theories; political economy; political uncertainty;
sovereign risk; Latin America

B

ondholders panicked when Lula da Silva was likely to win the
Brazilian presidency in 2002 but had no such concern during his
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re-election bid in 2006. Nor did the victories of left-leaning Cristina
Fernández in Argentina or even the re-election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela
have much of an effect. The most recent literature argues that it is not the
left per se but a shift to the left that leads to concern among bondholders
(Vaaler, Schrage, & Block, 2006). This would explain the reactions to the
aforementioned elections but not the lack of response to Andrés Manual
López Obrador almost winning the presidency in Mexico in 2006. An
alternative answer might be that risk was minimal because international
economic conditions were highly favorable to commodity producers and
international reserves were considerable (Singh, 2005). But does this explanation hold up over time, particularly during episodes of depressed global
liquidity and demand for commodities?
This article finds that, contrary to much of the political economy literature on the subject, party ideology is not an important determinant in movements in sovereign risk during presidential elections in emerging markets,
whereas external vulnerability, global appetite for risk, and predictability of
policies are. Based on financial data during national elections in Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela between 1994 and 2007, the article uses a
multimethod approach of qualitative, historical analysis of electoral campaigns combined with quantitative, statistical analysis of bond spread
movements, partisan ideology, party system institutionalization, reserves,
and other factors.
The article begins with brief reviews of partisan and structural approaches
and the role of uncertainty in explaining election-related outcomes. It then
explains the data and classification of elections used. The subsequent section
presents quantitative and qualitative analyses, with the intention of testing
theories emerging from perspectives that emphasize partisan identity, global
conditions, and policy uncertainty. Most specifically, it quantitatively tests the
following hypotheses based on the partisan approach, which bondholders
perceive: a victory of the left as negative; a shift from right to left as negative;
left to right as positive; and left to left as neutral; a distinction between left,
center-left, center-right, and right; and so on. An additional variable measuring
party system institutionalization is included to see if this conditions partisan
response. Statistical analyses also test assumptions of the importance of global
conditions and domestic vulnerability by including in the model international
reserve holdings, market volatility, and commodity prices. Historical analysis
of each electoral episode complements and advances the statistical tests by
indicating that interactions between policy uncertainty and external vulnerability, not partisanship, explain variance in perception of sovereign risk during
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elections. The inclusion of qualitative analysis is important in contextualizing
political phenomena to explain why outcomes differ when international market conditions appear to be similar.

Elections and the Economy: Theoretical Models
No single theory can explain the complex relationship between political
moments, such as elections, on financial and economic variables. The
central claim in this article is that a combination of global economic conditions, local foreign currency reserves, and domestic policy uncertainty, rather
than partisanship and ideology, provides the most complete understanding
of the relationship between elections and the economy in a globalized world.

Partisan Models
Although classical partisan models of political economy emphasize how
the partisan identity of a government affects economic indicators in developed countries (Alesina, Roubini, & Cohen, 1997; Hibbs, 1977), recent
contributions analyze developing countries and give more attention to the
way that electoral periods affect financial markets as opposed to macroeconomic indicators. Using financial market data from 1975-1998 for 78
developing countries, David Leblang (2002) found that speculative attacks
are most likely to occur during a left-wing government and after an election. Block and Vaaler (2004) and Vaaler et al. (2006), using data from 20
developing countries, find that financial markets are most concerned about
a shift to the left during elections but not the re-election of a candidate of
the left. These studies seem to confirm the basic premises of partisan theories: (a) that market actors distinguish politicians of the left and the right;
(b) once in office, politicians justify such distinctions; and (c) market actors
make investment decisions during electoral periods based on the ideology
of the likely victor.
Although these studies are very interesting as large-N studies, they are
limited by the need to maintain comparability of data (George & Bennett,
2005). For example, they face a problem of what Herron (2000) calls
“magnitude of partisanship,” or how far the distance is between left and
right (p. 327). Investors are unlikely to consider the partisan effect of a
Michael Foot or a Tony Blair identical, though statistical analysis labels
them both as left. Similarly, if Castañeda is correct, there should be markedly
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different responses to Latin America’s moderate, institutionalist left; and its
radical, populist, and anti-institutionalist left (Castañeda & Navia, 2007).
Moreover, even if the left-right divide can be assumed to be equivalent in
large-N studies, the analyst must also understand the meaning in terms of
the institutionalization of the party system (Mainwaring, 1999).
This article adopts a two-pronged strategy to evaluate the effect of partisanship and the electoral cycle on risk perceptions. First, it includes a
specific variable for party system institutionalization, which conditions the
clarity of party’s ideology and brand names (Vaaler et al., 2006). Second, it
investigates in detail the role of partisan explanations vis-à-vis other theories
through an in-depth discussion of each country.

Global Constraints
New partisan research recognizes the importance of contextual variation—specifically that “in small, open economies, domestic policy makers
may retain less autonomy over some policies . . . than in larger, less-exposed economies” (Franzese, 2002, p. 371). External constraints on domestic policy making have long been a concern in Latin America, and much of
the international political economy literature seems to argue that globalization weakens the role of domestic politics, making autonomous policy
making impossible (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Garrett, 1998; Wallerstein,
2004).
Susan Strange (as cited in Garrett, 1998) warned that although “states were
once the masters of markets, now it is markets which, on many crucial
issues, are the masters over the governments of states” (p. 787). In his study
of capital mobility and development in Latin America, Mahon (1996) finds
support for the idea of a virtual senate of asset holders because of constraints they impose on domestic policy; a similar argument is made by
Mosley (2003), who argues that investors have a powerful voice in emerging market countries’ political arenas.
Without a doubt, world commodity prices and risk tolerance on global
capital markets play a fundamental role in providing constraints and opportunities for emerging markets. Similarly, capital flows into and out of one
emerging market are often very influenced by events in another emerging
market or in the region as a whole. But contagion is often exaggerated and
bondholders do distinguish on the basis of policy choices and investment
climates particular to an emerging market.
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Uncertainty
A third hypothesis is that bondholders pay careful attention to domestic
policies and give considerable attention to electoral campaigns, shifting
financial assets not on the basis of politician ideology but on the presence
or absence of clear and credible policy. Spanakos and Renno (2006) make
this claim in their study of economic and financial responses to electoral
periods in Brazil (2006). Similarly, Starr (1999) argues that Argentine
economy adjusted better than that of Mexico in 1994-1995, because the former
“operated in a relatively certain electoral environment,” whereas the coalition supporting the latter was diverse and unable to find consensus (p. 204).
The current article contributes to improving the persuasiveness of the
uncertainty hypotheses through increasing the number of observations of
the within-case studies found in Spanakos and Renno (2006) and Starr
(1999) from 3 and 2 observations, respectively, to 14 distinct electoral
episodes spread over four countries within the same region. It is clear that
this hypothesis cannot be easily quantified and tested statistically and there
are no available measures of campaign uncertainty regarding candidates’
proposals. Therefore, the article uses process tracing to identify interaction
effects between policy uncertainty and external vulnerability.

Data and Variables
This article analyzes sovereign bond market reaction to electoral campaigns and postelectoral periods in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela
between 1994 and 2007, using a monthly time-series data set for each case.
These countries were selected because of the importance of their markets,1
and they display a range of partisan and policy orientations, offering a
diverse set of situations that can be analyzed. Argentina, Brazil, and
Venezuela all witnessed some shift toward the left in the period studied.
Although Mexico had no governments of the left, the candidate of the left
came within 1 percentage point of winning the 2006 elections. The shift
toward the left in the 2002 election in Brazil, in all analyzed elections in
Venezuela, and to a lesser extent in 2003 in Argentina and 2006 in Mexico,
constitutes “crucial cases” in evaluating partisan theories (Eckstein, 1975,
p. 118). The other observations produce results unexpected by partisan
accounts—namely, support for Chávez in 2004 coincided with a decrease
in risk; his election in 2006 had little effect, yet the re-election of Menem
(Argentina, 1995) and Cardoso (Brazil, 1998) did.
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The indicator of risk, the dependent variable in both quantitative and
qualitative analysis, is JP Morgan Chase’s Emerging Markets Bond Index
(EMBI). The EMBI is the price that investors are willing to pay for the
sovereign debt of a given country at a specific moment in time. It is the
spread of the yield of a sovereign bond relative to that of a U.S. Treasury
bond (considered a zero-risk benchmark) of a similar maturity.2 Increasing
in the cost of government borrowing raises the cost of borrowing across the
economy, slowing growth and increasing indebtedness. When debt is
denominated in foreign currency, this places additional pressures on monetary policy and foreign exchange reserves.
The EMBI is not a pure measure of political risk. First, it reflects the
dynamics within international capital markets, which are external to
domestic political events.3 Second, it is largely determined by the government’s ability to pay its debt, which is based on the size (relative to exports),
maturity (how long before it must make payments), and composition of
debt (if denominated in a foreign currency or linked to some benchmark
rate). Finally, the EMBI includes perceptions of willingness to pay debt.
Candidates claiming that they will not pay foreign debt while locals are
starving (e.g., Lula in the 1980s) or governments that prioritize redistribution of assets over protection of property rights of asset holders drive up
political risk (e.g., Chávez since 1998).
Despite these limitations, the EMBI is the benchmark used by bondholders (whose behavior is being studied) and is also used in a number of
political economy studies (Bernard & Leblang, 2006). Moreover, it is the
best available measure of investor perception of sovereign credit risk and a
baseline indicator of general credit risk.
Although risk can be quantified based on probabilistic statistical projections, uncertainty resists such methods. Given a situation where a government will loosen monetary policy to spur spending, analysts can predict the
possible effect that this will have on inflation and evaluate this in terms of
the present value of a debt instrument. When a new president comes into
office and has given no signals whether previous monetary policies will be
continued, loosened, or abandoned altogether, uncertainty exists, making it
more difficult to make accurate predictions of risk. The distinction between
risk and uncertainty is largely heuristic, however, as bondholders, particularly in emerging markets, tend to conflate the two. Because bondholders
must make decisions about portfolio allocations regardless of the quantifiability of conditions of uncertainty, there is a tendency to overshoot estimations of uncertainty and for this to play a more significant role in analysis
of emerging market bond markets.
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The independent variables included in the analysis are derived from the
theories discussed previously. A first central variable is the indicator of
ideological change during the electoral period. A caveat must be made in
identifying presidential candidates as being on the left or right, because
partisan identification in Latin America is not always straightforward.4 This
article will label parties following Michael Coppedge’s work on parties and
party systems in Latin America (Coppedge, 1998).5 Certain adjustments
were made because Coppedge identifies parties and winning candidates but
does not identify caretaker regimes (see Table 1).6
The impact of Coppedge’s (1998) classification of elections is tested
through the inclusion in the model of dummy variables for each of the distinct types of changes that occurred in the elections. So all center-right to
center-left changes become a dummy variable and so forth for all the other
types of elections.
Party institutionalization is measured as the average age of the top two
governing parties and the main opposition parties or a subset of according
to the situation in each country, as defined in the Database of Political
Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh, 2001). This variable is
included in the model to control for the inchoate characteristics of certain
Latin American party systems, which could weaken the influence of parties
and ideology on economic turbulence. The expectation is that older party
systems will decrease risk, because it increases the brand names of parties.
Party system should also condition the uncertainty present in elections in
which there are changes toward the left. This situation occurred in the
presidential elections of the 1999 and 2003 in Argentina, 2002 in Brazil,
and 1998 in Venezuela. An interaction term was added for the Brazilian
elections in which a center coalition stayed in power.
Another set of political determinants of risk is associated with traditional
electoral cycle variables. The first one indicates the 6 months prior to the election,
with a regressive count from –6 to the –1, from the farthest away month to the
closest one. As an election approaches, there should be greater risk and therefore
a positive effect on the EMBI. The second electoral cycle indicator is a progressive count of the 6 months after the election, ranging from 1 to 6. The relationship here should be negative with EMBI, because as one moves away from
elections, risk should decline as a victor appears and begins to choose ministers
and coalition partners. This reduces uncertainty surrounding eventual government policy. Thus, the election variable, a dummy indicating the month of the
election, should also have a positive effect on risk assessment.
The next set of variables examines the claim that it is vulnerability to
external events that explain perceptions of country risk regardless of
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Table 1
Partisan direction of Electoral Change
by Election in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela
Country and Election Year

Incumbent

Winner

Partisan Direction

Argentina 1994
Menem
Menem
Center Right–Center
			   Right (re-election)
Argentina 1999
Menem
De La Rua
Center Right–Center Left
Argentina 2003
Duhalde
Kirchner
Center Left–Left
Brazil 1994
Franco
Cardoso
Center–Center
			   (same coalition)
Brazil 1998
Cardoso
Cardoso
Center–Center
			   (re-election)
Brazil 2002
Cardoso
Lula
Center–Left
Brazil 2006
Lula
Lula
Left–Left (re-election)
Mexico 1994
Salinas
Zedillo
Center Right–Center
			   Right (same party)
Mexico 2000
Zedillo
Fox
Center Right–Center
			   Right
Mexico 2006
Fox
Calderon
Center Right–Center
			   Right (same party)
Venezuela 1998
Caldera
Chavez
Centera–Left
Venezuela 2000
Chavez
Chavez
Left–Left (re-election)
Venezuela 2004
Chavez
Chavez
Left–Left (confirmation)
Venezuela 2006
Chavez
Chavez
Left–Left (re-election)
a. Rafael Caldera ran as an independent in 1994. His coalition leaned toward the center-left
during its first 2 years and toward the center-right during its last 2 years. Thus, he is coded as
centrist.

domestic political events. The analysis used the level of foreign currency
reserves as a proxy for access to foreign (hard) currency and vulnerability
to financial crises more generally. This variable was obtained in the
International Financial Statistics data set from the International Monetary
Fund and was logged to increase comparability. Because credit risk is what
is being investigated and so much Latin American debt has been historically
denominated in dollars or linked to the value of the dollar, this indicator is
especially important.
In addition to the vulnerability to the external environment, it is also
important to take into consideration the liquidity of the global market and
its appetite for risk. Two variables are included in the model. The Chicago
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, which indicates volatility over a
period of 30 days in the S&P 500 is a widely used indicator of risk appetite
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among investors. Because investors consider global market conditions, the
lower the volatility in the S&P 500, the more willing investors should be to
purchase higher risk instruments, such as emerging market bonds. In addition, as the export profiles of the economies analyzed earn a significant
portion of money from commodities and emerging markets are more likely
to receive investment booms when commodity prices increase, a measure
of global commodity prices, PALLFNFW, derived from the International
Monetary Fund is used. The PALLFNFW is a combined measure of the
price indices for all fuel and nonfuel commodities. This indicator is used,
because it is the most holistic index of commodity prices and all of the
governments analyzed here, to varying degrees, export petroleum and/or
natural gas, as well as other commodities.
The model also controls for local factors including the Consumer Price
Index and Central Bank independence, the latter measured by the length of
tenure of each bank’s president or governor (Cukierman, 1992; Cukierman,
Webb, & Neyapti, 1992). The expectation is that longer tenure is perceived
by investors to mean more independence and therefore should reduce the
effect of elections on uncertainty.

Analysis
The pooled sample of countries is analyzed using cross-sectional timeseries linear models with feasible generalized least squares correcting for
AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and heteroskedasticity across panels.
A model is tested with the conditional effect of party system age (Model 2)
and without interaction terms (Model 1). Fixed effects by country are estimated to control for other country-specific factors that are not modeled. For
each individual country, Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression is used with robust
standard errors, which corrects serious autocorrelation problems found
within panels and for cross-panel heteroskedasticity violation.7 A lagged
term of the dependent variable to control for possible layover effects from
1 month to the next is also included in the models.
Results are presented in Table 2. The most influential variables in explaining EMBI variation over time and space are the lagged term of the dependent
variable, the natural logarithm of international reserves, and Central Bank
independence. Volatility Index (VIX) is influential in the pooled sample and
in Brazil, whereas commodity prices are significant for Mexico. All vary in
the expected direction. That is, the size of the reserves, central bank independence, and commodity prices all have a negative correlation with the
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EMBI. The same relationship exists in most cases between the VIX and the
EMBI. The political variables, however, perform very poorly. None is statistically significant, which indicates that the electoral cycle, characteristic of the
change in parties and levels of party institutionalization do not affect risk
evaluations. This suggests that sovereign risk is relatively indifferent to the
political situation. The exception here is Brazil, in which the election month,
a change from center to left (Cardoso to Lula in 2002), and the interaction
between party institutionalization and center to left change all influence risk.
The election month always has a soothing effect on risk, and during the
actual month of the election, risk normally decreases. The change from
Cardoso to Lula did affect risk, but it appears to be an isolated effect when
compared to the other Latin American countries analyzed here. The effect
of the change from center to left was also conditional on the level of party
institutionalization in Brazil. For a 1-unit change in year of party system,
there was a significant reduction in the negative impact of the center to left
change that occurred in 2002. Therefore, in Brazil, party system institutionalization has the expected theoretical effect. But the absence of a party
system effect suggests that the effect in Brazil in 2002 may have been
caused not by the youth of the Workers’ Party per se but the uncertainty
generated by the potential of its leading a government coalition. The possibility that regression analysis in this and the other elections analyzed
might be missing part of the story or important interactive effects leads to
the next section, which qualitatively analyzes the 14 cases.

A Historical Analysis of Uncertainty and Elections
The elections that most significantly increased the perception of sovereign
risk were those of 1995 in Argentina, 1998 and 2002 in Brazil, and 1998 in
Venezuela. The partisan effect here is ambiguous at best. Even the policy
uncertainty hypothesis is not completely straightforward, as there may have
been more policy uncertainty in other elections. However, the interaction
between policy uncertainty and external economic conditions and domestic
reserves explain why these four episodes generated the greatest risk. The
next section relies on process-tracing through within-case analysis to identify when and how policy uncertainty and external vulnerability produced
sensations of risk (George & Bennett, 2005, ch. 10). The analysis highlights
results unexpected by partisan theories such as the increase in the EMBI
during the 1995 elections in Argentina, the 1998 elections in Brazil, the
lack of change in the 2006 elections in Mexico, and the decrease during the
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Model 2: 		
EMBI
SE

Model 3: 		
Argentina
SE

Model 4: 		
Brazil
SE

Model 5: 		
Mexico
SE

Model 6:
Venezuela

Lagged EMBI
0.94
0.01***
0.94
0.01***
0.86
0.11*** 0.71
0.08***
0.65
0.09***
0.78
Pre-election
–10.15 14.14
–11.50
14.59
–50.52
32.44
10.92
13.67
–8.96
6.85
–10.18
Post-election
–4.62 14.63
–4.04
15.07
41.75
42.14
–17.06
15.92
–0.11
8.47
–5.45
Election
–143.79 95.44
–144.15
95.80
–162.06 350.08 –213.75
126.36*
–7.35
20.74
–84.37
Center-right to
–66.90 103.04
30.45 413.42
–442.37 405.87						
   center-left
Center-right to
25.65 67.52
23.30
68.39
–136.44 176.29			
–24.40
33.77		
   center-right
Center-left to left
149.15 109.80
–1,826.54 3,887.00 –4,437.47 5,152.34						
Left to left
32.72 70.62
29.64
71.49			
6.95
52.96
24.23
33.95		
Center to center
50.07 82.67
221.74 484.31			
223.74
266.08				
Center to left
15.92 82.46
–53.58 141.17			
45,730.72
14,778.19***			
–20.85
Age of party system
0.60
1.67
0.55
1.74
–13.13
9.79
22.85
16.72
2.56
2.63
0.48
Party × Center to Left			
2.16
3.86			
–2,473.53
800.30***		
4.01
4.74
Party × Center-Left			
104.84 206.35
216.13 274.83						
   to Left
Party × Center-Right 			
–4.15
16.40
11.52
14.66						
   to Center-Left
Party × Center 		
–12.99
35.21			
–5.25
19.92					
   to Center

Model 1: 		
EMBI
SE

Table 2
Regressions for Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI)
in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela: 1993 to 2007

(continued)

158.81
1.74

0.08***
11.61
8.73
80.65

SE
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Model 2: 		
EMBI
SE

Model 3: 		
Argentina
SE

Model 4: 		
Brazil
SE

3.57
–1.72
2,190.46
161
1
.90
2.04

0.82**
2.64
0.58*

2.14
4.29
–1.00

1,812.81 822.28**
162		
1		
.89		
2.08		

0.44

0.06

1.80

–0.82

–223.19

83.97**

Model 6:
Venezuela

–181.65

Model 5: 		
Mexico
SE

950.39**

5.68
0.78**

0.88

0.31

94.87**

SE

Source: International Financial Statistics and Database of Political Institutions: Electoral cycle variables, Central Bank Independence and election characteristics, coded
by authors.
*p significant at 10%. **p significant at 5%. ***p significant at 1%.

International reserves
–93.84 46.84**
–96.13
47.17** –550.58 474.02 –137.63
54.15**
   (Natural log)
Change in the
0.04
0.37
0.07
0.38
9.07
5.89
–2.25
1.65
   Consumer
   Price Index
Index of Fuel and Non Fuel
0.82
0.95
0.81
0.96
–11.17
5.64**
2.80
1.08**
Commodities
Volatility Index
7.24
2.47***
7.45
2.55***
7.28
10.52
9.33
3.59**
Central Bank
–0.50
0.48
–0.50
0.48
–3.15
2.01
–3.52
1.20***
   independence
Constant
777.64 429.11*
791.61 431.99* 5,880.45 4,610.81 1,151.02
638.51*
Observations
639		
639		
158		
162		
Number of panels
4		
4		
1		
1		
R-squared					
.94		
.91		
Durbin-Watson					
1.99		
1.96		
   transformed

Model 1: 		
EMBI
SE

Table 2   (continued)
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revocatory referendum in 2004 in Venezuela. Examining these examples of
deviance provides alternative explanations for the increase in perception of
risk in Argentina in 2003, Brazil in 2002, and Venezuela in 1998—cases
that are crucial for partisan theories.
Argentina
The three presidential elections studied here show the re-election in
1995 of Carlos Menem, the center-right president; the 1999 election of
Gustavo de la Rua, leading a center-left coalition; and the 2003 victory of
Nestor Kirchner, a leftist peronist.8 Risk peaked 2 to 3 months prior to all
elections, but the most troubling were the elections of 1995 and 2003, not
1999 and 2003, as partisan theories predict (see Table 3). The question is,
what explains why the re-election of Menem coincided with an increase in
perception of risk? And does that explanation hold for the slight increase in
1999 and significant increase in 2003?
Menem eliminated hyperinflation, and his victory over Frepaso’s José
Octávio Bordón was by 20 points.9 The margin of victory and the re-election
of a market-preferred center-right candidate should not have contributed to
an increase in risk. At one point, Bordón’s Frepaso coalition did threaten
the Menem candidacy, but as The Economist (“Argentina shades,” 1994)
reported, “no serious candidate today . . . proposes even to reverse the freemarket reforms” (p. 38); nor was there any challenge to the convertibility
plan (which constitutionally established the peso as equal to 1 dollar). What
was concerning was how Argentina would adjust to the fallout from the
devaluation of the Mexican peso, which had affected perception of creditworthiness in the region as a whole. These concerns slowed support for
Bordón as “Argentines think . . . who better to find solutions, ask Peronists,
than the slayers of hyperinflation?” (“Argentina fighting,” 1995, p. 43). To
bond holders, a vote for Menem meant the continuation of a relatively
predictable and credible set of policies and policy makers. Nevertheless,
the increased electoral strength of Frepaso and the increased independence
of Peronist politicians meant that the next government would face more
constraints on its ability to make potentially unpopular reforms. This can
be seen by the increase in the EMBI following the elections, which suggests that there were indeed governability concerns. These concerns were
exacerbated by the shift toward risk aversion that followed the Mexican
devaluation. As investors became more risk averse, the premium on
reserves and policy uncertainty increased. Thus, the best explanation for
the unexpected rise in the EMBI in 1995 is due to an interaction of political
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11/94
to
11/95

826
1,074
1,279
1,638
1,488
1,283
1,029
1,206
1,221
1,205
1,178
1,293
1,073

Months Prior
and After
Election

t–6
t–5
t–4
t–3
t–2
t–1
t
t+1
t+2
t+3
t+4
t+5
t+6

Time

595
784
756
846
773
663
635
650
533
594
548
564
566

04/99
to
04/00

Argentina

6,064
6,155
6,342
5,985
6,615
6,096
5,059
5,164
4,485
5,021
4,916
5,355
5,509

10/02
to
10/03

1,127
1,087
1,186
1,094
810
737
845
815
919
1,054
1,211
1,441
1,213

04/94
to
4/95
463
570
660
607
1,419
1,332
1,200
983
1,239
1,516
1,378
1,044
875

4/98
to
4/99

4/02
to
4/03
847
982
1,560
2,360
1,643
2,412
1,759
1,622
1,460
1,331
1,189
1,050
819

Brazil

215
270
252
222
222
232
222
221
190
189
194
167
156

4/06
to
4/07
402
484
547
424
532
505
430
435
456
445
863
1,023
1,384

01/94
to
01/95
433
353
345
381
434
378
349
314
313
362
383
391
362

1/00
to
1/01

Mexico

132
122
140
135
157
154
135
130
141
132
140
115
124

1/06
to
1/07
669
833
2,526
1,573
1,399
1,623
1,309
1,472
1,399
1,140
813
1,020
926

06/98
to
06/99
913
813
895
946
980
892
839
785
802
863
903
958
842

01/00
to
01/01

226
199
207
233
225
234
182
211
224
206
222
259
341

06/06
to
06/07

Venezuela

Table 3
Emerging Markets Bond Index at the End of 6 Months, Prior to and After Elections

720
647
684
659
643
584
550
490
459
400
403
452
427

Recall 02/04
to
02/05
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uncertainty—related to Menem’s ability to maintain governability and discipline over his coalition—and the change in investor sentiment following
Mexico’s devaluation. That said, Menem’s popular support and credibility
served as a break on the increased perception of credit risk. It is clear that the
role of party ideology of the victorious party was irrelevant.
The 1999 election had a much less significant effect, although the twoterm president was replaced by a shift toward the left. Both Eduardo
Duhalde, two-term Peronist governor of Buenos Aires province, and centrist Fernando de la Rua, a former mayor of Buenos Aires representing the
center-left Frepaso coalition, critiqued Menem, but neither offered a break
with fundamental macroeconomic policies. Even still, the size of a debt
essentially denominated in dollars had become worrisome and “[i]nvestors
have started to worry that Argentina’s exchange rate, even though its parity
with the dollar is written into law, could yet go the way of its much less
rigidly pegged counterpart in Brazil” (“Leaders,” 1999, p. 15). To this end,
both candidates insisted on their maintenance of the currency board, thus
giving clear signals of policy continuity. However, unlike the 1995 elections, global conditions were more favorable. Thus, with little uncertainty
about broad fundamental issues, there was no reason to expect a short-term
spark that would deepen concern, though worries remained about the longterm policy mix.
In 2003, Menem challenged a progressive coalition of Peronists behind
Nestor Kirchner. The Economist (“The Americas,” 2003) writes: “[i]n policy terms, the run-off is a battle between Mr. Menem’s glitzy conservatism
and Mr. Kirchner’s nebulous social democracy” (p. 57). The ambiguity of
Kirchner’s proposals as well as his status as an unknown governor of
Patagonia forced Kirchner to engage credibility-building exercises such as
securing support from caretaker president Eduardo Duhalde who, despite
having defaulted and devalued, regained credibility among bondholders.
Kirchner’s post-Washington consensus left-wing appeal was bolstered by
linking himself to Lula rather than Chávez.10 Finally, his trump card was
publicly declaring that he would maintain Roberto Lavagna as finance minister, a definitive commitment to maintain policies that were considered
credible and predictable (“The Americas,” 2003, p. 57). In addition, the
2003 election occurred as global growth and particularly commodity prices
were rapidly rising. The increase in the EMBI, however, despite improving
commodity prices, global liquidity, and a return of investment to Argentina,
suggests that the international environment was not enough. Kirchner’s
attempts to reduce policy uncertainty clearly helped but were insufficient as
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both his vision of post-Washington Consensus, and the possible governability
issues that he might face were never persuasively settled during the campaign. The postelection increase in the EMBI supports this latter point.

Brazil
The Brazilian EMBI increased prior to the 1998 and 2002 elections, but
there was little effect prior to the 2006 elections, and it decreased prior to the
1994 elections. The increase in the pre-electoral periods in 2002 and the lack
of concern in 2006 is predicted by partisan theories, but that of 1998 is not
(Vaaler et al., 2006). As with the 1995 elections in Argentina, an examination of the unexpected rise in risk in 1998 explains the limitations of partisan
approaches. The evidence suggests that the concern in 1998 was about
Cardoso’s ability to respond to exchange rate pressures introduced by international crisis, not about Cardoso per se or the credibility of his particular
group of policy makers. In contrast, in 2002, the concern was the inability to
predict what policies Lula might pursue as president particularly amid risk
aversion on global markets and moderate levels of external vulnerability.
The ideology of the Workers’ Party candidate did not play a significant role
in increasing perception of sovereign risk.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the finance minister who was credited as
having engineered the remarkably successful exchange-rate based stabilization real plan,11 won the 1994 presidential elections against Lula da Silva
of the Workers’ Party. As support for Cardoso’s candidacy increased, the
likelihood of continuation of policies that were considered viable by bondholders increased, and the perception of default risk decreased considerably. In addition, the interest of bondholders to re-enter Latin American
markets in the early 1990s contributed to a reduction in perception of risk.
The Brazilian electoral campaign of 1998 followed the Asian (1997) and
Russian (1998) crises, which centered around currency mismatches and current account problems and led to several devaluations and one major default.
The realities of electoral politics forced president and candidate Cardoso to
defend the real prior to the elections, creating considerable opportunities for
speculation, reducing foreign reserves, and driving up the EMBI (as debt
levels were harder to sustain). One month before the elections, Cardoso
increased interest rates to defend the real, while Lula proposed a referendum
on whether capital controls should be imposed (Moffett & Fritsch, 1998). It
is not surprising that despite the vulnerability of the Brazilian market to the
global financial malaise, bondholders believed that Cardoso could more
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credibly weather the storm of contagion and constrain inflationary impulses
of a possible devaluation than Lula could. Nevertheless, the appeal for
Lula’s discourse and the potential risks of holding together a reform coalition following a potential devaluation was a concern, as is evidenced by the
postelection increase in the EMBI (when the devaluation occurred). Thus, as
in the case of the Argentine elections in 1995, external factors spurred an
increase the risk associated with governability, but the selection of the preferred candidate contained perceptions of risk.
In 2002, Lula, now a center-left moderate, was the forerunner among a
field of candidates who ubiquitously proposed a rather ambiguous concept:
change. Given Lula and the Workers’ Party’s historic resistance to policies
that bondholders favored and the Workers’ Party’s lack of experience in
national governments, there were questions about what Lula would do once
in office. The clarity demanded by bondholders was especially important,
given the debt default in Argentina in December of the previous year and
the generally low risk tolerance in capital markets. Lula’s “Letter to the
Brazilian People” outlined a sense of fiscal responsibility and moderate
principles, but before and after releasing that letter, he also spoke of renegotiating contracts and made comments about future monetary and fiscal
policy that conflicted with the very content of his letter (Spanakos &
Renno, 2006). The increase in the EMBI led to increased interest rates, a
weakening of the exchange rate, and accelerating inflation, which contributed to exploding Brazilian debt, as some 80% of debt was based on those
rates. The collapse of Argentina was troubling for investors, but commodity
prices were increasing throughout the campaign. Thus, the international
environment presented a situation of multiple equilibria. The ambiguous
content and inability to predict policies of a future Lula government
encouraged bondholders to favor the more negative equilibrium and created
a space for an attack on the real.
Once elected, Lula decreased uncertainty through several credibilitybuilding exercises (the choice of Antonio Palocci as finance minister and
Henrique Meirelles as central bank governor, as well as increasing the fiscal
surplus target set by the International Monetary Fund agreement; see Sola,
2006), which set clear guidelines for the type of policies that would characterize his government. The shift to policies endorsed by his predecessor and
investors was crucial in the rapid reduction in the EMBI in 2003 and its
continued decline during his term in office. His re-election in 2006 posed no
threat, because his policies were both predictable and had received relatively
favorable reviews from market analysts. In addition, 2006 was a year of
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robust global growth, considerable liquidity in international markets, and
high prices for commodities, which reduced the financing pressures on
nearly all emerging markets.
Mexico
Although the Mexican sample only provides victories of the center right,
it contains the elections that produced the end of a one-party regime (2000)
and intensely contested elections (2006). The lack of a significantly
increase in the EMBI during the pre-electoral periods is because all
Mexican elections took place during relatively good moments for global
capital markets, the role of Central Bank autonomy, and policy convergence
among Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI or Institutional Revolu
tionary Party) and Partido Acción Nacional (PAN or National Action Party)
technocrats and politicians.
The beginning of the North American Free Trade Agreement in January
1994 was an event highlighted by the Chiapas Rebellion and the assassinations of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio and PRI president
José Francisco Ruiz Massieu. Pressures on the government were considerable, yet neither of the two preeminent candidates, the PRI’s Ernesto
Zedillo nor Diego Fernández de Cevallos, proposed any significant change
in either monetary or fiscal policy. An increase in the U.S. federal funds rate
placed pressure on the peso, which forced the government to spend foreign
currency reserves and shift toward dollar-denominated short-term bonds
with high interest rates. But importantly, it was not until after Zedillo took
office and, as a response to the reduction of reserves, devalued the currency
that the EMBI increased considerably. In addition, despite concerns about
Chiapas, Mexico had been enjoying a foreign investment boom and led
emerging market countries in regaining the attention of global investors.
Thus, the election took place during a period of generous global credit
markets and domestic policy clarity, though there was domestic tightening
of credit and an increase in concern about political risk.
The critical political transition—the first time an opposition candidate had
been allowed to win the presidency since the Mexican Revolution—made
possible by the 2000 elections generated only a moderate increase in the
EMBI. The victorious PAN was a probusiness party, and its candidate,
Vicente Fox, a liberal, made it clear that political change was about eliminating authoritarianism and corruption, not reversing economic reforms. There
were concerns about whether the PRI, as it moved to the opposition, would
become more populist and less liberal, but concerns about the Mexican government’s future policies and willingness to meet its debt obligations
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were limited. In addition, although the U.S. stock market had crashed, the
real economy in the United States had not yet slowed and Mexican reserves
remained strong. As such, the external environment remained relatively favorable. Thus, in the midst of relatively favorable external conditions and clarity about macroeconomic policy, political transition did not increase risk.
Felipe Calderón, a political conservative and supporter of free market
enterprise, represented no threat to markets when he won the 2006 elections
as the candidate of the PAN. Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador’s (known in
Mexico as AMLO) program for government was remarkably similar to that
of Lula and other center-left leaders, and he sent road shows to Wall Street
to assure them of his commitment to fiscal responsibility and his respect for
central bank independence. Although he had been critical of fiscal constraint under neoliberal governments, he demonstrated fiscal responsibility
while he was governor of the Federal District. The Economist (“Leaders,”
2006) rejected the idea raised by the Calderón campaign that AMLO was
“a Mexican version of Hugo Chavez,” though it was not clear if he was a
“modern social democrat” like Lula (p. 10).
Why did electing Lula panic markets while almost electing AMLO did
not? Here the perception of Central Bank autonomy in conditioning policy
choices and maintaining policy continuity seems to explain why electing
Lula panicked markets while almost electing AMLO did not. Although The
Economist was concerned about contempt that AMLO had shown for institutions, such as the Central Bank, the Mexican Central Bank had been de
jure and de facto independent since 1993 and was widely regarded for its
competence and nonpartisan analysis. This is distinct from the election of
Lula in 2002, where the Central Bank’s recently achieved de facto autonomy
was the result of the relationship between Cardoso and his Central Bank
governors. It had not been institutionalized, and Lula had rejected legislation to make autonomy and/or independence formal. AMLO’s critiques
were unlikely to change Central Bank direction, although it was unclear
whether Lula would follow up on statements about widening the band for
inflation targets and reducing the role of the finance ministry vis-à-vis the
planning ministry, either of which would have considerably reduced Central
Bank autonomy. Finally, the high price of petroleum, Mexico’s main export,
and the general state of Mexico’s debt profile also contributed to a muted
sense of risk. The perception of a low-risk institutional environment continued after the election even amid AMLO’s postelectoral protests and setting
up of a “shadow government.” As a result, the potential victory of AMLO
might have introduced some policy uncertainty, but Central Bank autonomy
and domestic and international fundamentals tempered this concern.
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Venezuela
The Venezuelan data are especially troublesome for partisan theories.
Chávez’s victory in 1998 is linked to a rapid rise in the EMBI, a mild
increase in the pre-electoral period of 2000, a decrease throughout the recall
election of 2004, and a moderate increase following the 2006 elections.
What then explains why perception of risk increased only when Chávez was
first elected in 1998 and a few months after his re-election in 2006?
The 1998 elections provided clear evidence that the two-party dominance of the Punto Fijo system was over (Dietz & Myers, 2007). In 1998,
Chávez, a former coup leader with no governing experience, was supported
by a broad but largely uncoordinated base of voters disenchanted with systemic parties and who applauded that he was “the only candidate to attack
the market economics that the Caldera government belatedly accepted two
years ago” (“The Americas,” 1998, p. 30). He proposed a more participatory republic based on a vague ideology of “Bolivarianism,” which combined elements of socialism, neostructuralism, and radical democracy. His
enormous popularity was concerning to bondholders who identified him as
a maverick who was entering a political vacuum where he would be capable
of making very significant and unpredictable changes. His anticapitalist
and anti-imperialist rhetoric gave clear signals that he was likely to use the
oil wealth available to redistribute assets as opposed to paying debt.
Moreover, given the low value of petroleum, Chávez would have few policy
instruments available to make the social changes that he proposed, which
could lead toward fiscal irresponsibility.
In office, Chávez showed policy restraint and even endorsed some conservative macroeconomic policies, while he continued to launch philippics
against oligarchs (Buxton, 2003). So in 2000, he was hardly the candidate
favored by the market, but bondholders had a better idea of how to separate the
rhetoric from the policies. Importantly, the considerable support for the 1999
constitution and the overwhelming victory of Chávez and the coalition of parties and movements associated with him conferred a legitimacy and predictability to the system. What was less predictable was whether Chávez would follow
a developmentalist, state-led growth approach to macroeconomic policy or
whether he would move toward socialism, as critics alleged (Lebowitz, 2006).
The ambiguity of future policies while new rules of the game were being established occurred alongside a recovery in global petroleum prices, which
improved the government’s ability to continue to meet its foreign debt obligations and which were—and remained until 2007—fairly minimal, given the
value of petroleum as potential collateral. Like the other countries studied here,
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commodity prices are inversely correlated with risk, though the considerable
value of petroleum, particularly since 2004, has provided assurances for
Venezuela’s debt, even though it has pursued policies that are considered
unwise and unsustainable by the majority of analysts of that market.
During the recall referendum of 2004, Chávez solidified his support,
which was particularly essential in reducing policy uncertainty and concerns about regime stability following the April coup of 2002 and the general strike at the end of that year. Chávez was able to consolidate his regime
in 2003 due to increased petroleum prices and the introduction of “social
Missions.” By the time the recall election occurred in 2004, the economy
was growing robustly, and state-directed social development programs
were a regular part of Venezuelan life. This, combined with the lack of
credibility of the opposition, led to a resounding victory for the government
in the recall election of 2004. The significant decrease in the EMBI during
the election campaign, thus, had nothing to do with a move away from a
leftist politician or the moderation of that politician. If anything, Chávez
became more committed to using fiscal policy in very aggressive ways to
promote social equity. Rather, the decline in risk was due to the increased
value of petroleum vis-à-vis the small foreign debt stock and the increasing
consolidation of new rules of the game by Chávez.
The increased familiarity with Chávez, stockpiling of foreign currency
reserves, and the boom in global markets explain the relatively mild change
in the EMBI prior to 2006. His declarations about moving toward a vague
21st-century socialism since 2005 did not mark a clear shift away from the
general state-centered, prodomestic producer economy that he had been
pursuing since at least 2003. The EMBI increased after his re-election,
because he believed that he had a new mandate to change the “geometry of
power,” which meant substantially altering the 1999 constitution. The effort
proved unsuccessful, but what is relevant is that Chávez’s move to accelerate the transition to 21st-century socialism through a very vague set of 69
constitutional amendments rendered the policy environment unpredictable,
driving up risk, even despite record prices for petroleum and robust dollar
reserves. Thus, even when domestic and economic fundamentals are strong,
policy uncertainty can drive risk.

Conclusion
There is little quantitative and qualitative support for partisan explanations of sovereign risk related to elections in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
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and Venezuela between 1994 and 2007. This is true of both simple partisan (right-left difference) and more sophisticated partisan accounts that
distinguish between incumbent and challenging leftist candidates and
between radical and institutional lefts. These results question how
important the right-left scale is in studies of Latin America. The data
also control for party system institutionalization, a variable often
ignored in the analysis of how elections affect financial markets. The
data show that older party systems in Latin America do not necessarily lead
to increased stability and predictability of the political system, as is
claimed by the literature on partisanship (Mainwaring, 1999).
The quantitative analysis is strongest in support of the role of external
vulnerability and risk tolerance. This finding confirms conventional wisdom
among market professionals, that risk is based on ability to pay debt, which
is best represented by access to foreign currency. Foreign reserves are critical for emerging markets, particularly during downturns in global liquidity,
because many emerging market borrowers issue debt in foreign currencies,
creating a potentially unsustainable currency mismatch (Eichengreen &
Hausmann, 2005). The obvious policy implication is that governments
should try to denominate their debt in local currency and should maintain
foreign currency reserves that exceed what may be considered adequate
under noncrisis situations.
But how large the stock of foreign currency reserves should be to
ensure confidence in a government’s ability to meet its debt obligations is
subject to perception. This is where the policy environment enters and the
issue of uncertainty emerges. A reserve of 30 billion U.S. dollars may be
sufficient in one context but not in another. More important, for emerging
market countries, it may be both at the same time, as was the case in
Brazil in 2002, when perceptions of policy uncertainty led to the negative
interpretation of foreign reserves driving the market. If economic fundamentals allow for multiple equilibria, policy clarity can explain perceptions of risk. Moreover, as is the case in the postelectoral period in
Venezuela in 2006, political uncertainty can drive sovereign risk even in
the face of record reserves and commodity prices. Thus, tracing interactions between policy uncertainty, policies chosen, and vulnerability to
external events best explains perceptions of sovereign movement during
electoral periods.
Future research should examine these processes during ministerial shuffles and other periods of change between elections. It should also examine
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whether the relationship that credit markets perceive between risk and
uncertainty is echoed in other arenas such as equity markets.

Notes
1. Venezuela’s market is less important, but due to the foreign policy of president Chávez,
the purchase of the debt of neighboring countries, and the burgeoning local currency debt
market, it is becoming increasingly important.
2. This is measured in terms of basis points, in which 100 basis points is the equivalent
of 1%.
3. When there is greater liquidity, interest in investing in emerging markets, or when
commodity prices are high, investors will be less exacting. Perception that certain other countries or regions are “hot” can reduce market demand for the debt of a particular country and
increase risk. Similarly, internal dynamics of capital markets can punish one country for the
failures of another, ironically even if the former is seen as relatively successful. This was the
case in 2001, when traders who lost money or could not sell Argentine debt sold Brazilian debt
to cover their losses, increasing Brazil’s Emerging Markets Bond Index.
4. Part of this is due to low levels of partisan ideology and/or policy clarity among many
political parties (Mainwaring, 1999) and a relative convergence left and right in Latin America
about economic policies in the most recent wave of democratization.
5. The more recent classifications are considered to be preliminary by Coppedge (Personal
communication, July 6, 2007).
6. For example, the de la Rua Coalition was center left, but Nestor Kirchner was replaced
by Eduardo Duhalde, a conservative. The Brazilian elections were also coded slightly differently. Given that there was significant continuity between the Itamar Franco and Fernando
Henrique Cardoso administrations, both were coded as center.
7. The dependent and independent variables were tested for unit root problems using the
Dickey-Fuller test and detected problems only in the Consumer Price Index variable. Given that
it did not present consistent effects on Emerging Markets Bond Index, it does not appear to be
a substantial problem. A violation of homoskedasticity was detected in the pooled sample using
the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity as well as a problem of first order
correlation, using the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data. This was corrected by
using cross-sectional time-series Feasible Generalized Least Squares regression for the pooled
data and Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression for country-specific analysis.
8. As stated earlier, left to right labels are not uncontroversial. Coppedge (1998) labels
the Partido Justicialista (Peronist party) as center-right, and so that distinction is maintained
here. Duhalde was clearly an opponent of the Peronists who surrounded president Menem, but
he stressed social concerns more than Menem did.
9. All electoral data are from Georgetown University’s Political Database on the
Americas: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/elecdata.html
10. The linkage to Chávez is very important, as Evo Morales success seems to have been
boosted by Chávez’s support, whereas Felipe Calderón and Alan Garcia were able to gain
points by associating Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Ollanta Humala with Chávez.
11. Unlike previous efforts at controlling inflation, the real plan was more credible, largely
because of the successful negotiation with Congress by Edmar Bacha, secretary of economic
policies at that time, to anchor the new currency through fiscal restraint.
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